Principal-agent problem with minimum performance insurance: the case of mandatory individual pension accounts

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Borradores de Economía; No. 546

Date published

2009-01-08

Date

2009-01-08

Authors

Julio-Román, Juan Manuel

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ISSN

ISBN

Document language

spa
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Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.

The opinions contained in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not commit Banco de la República or its Board of Directors.

Abstract

A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in

Description

JEL Codes

D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory

Temática

Keywords

Keywords

Incentives , Agency theory , Pensions

Citation

URI

https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5563
 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5563
 https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/546.html
 https://doi.org/10.32468/be.546

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Borradores de Economía

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Esta obra está bajo licencia internacional Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial 4.0.

Este documento ha sido depositado por parte de el(los) autor(es) bajo la siguiente constancia de depósito