Principal-agent problem with minimum performance insurance: the case of mandatory individual pension accounts
Borradores de Economía; No. 546
Date published
2009-01-08Date of last update
2009-01-08Document language
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Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.
Abstract
A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in
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https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5563https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5563
https://doi.org/10.32468/be.546
https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/546.html
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/005222.html
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