Principal-agent problem with minimum performance insurance: the case of mandatory individual pension accounts

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dc.coverage.sucursalBogotáspa
dc.creatorJulio-Román, Juan Manuel
dc.creator.firmaJulio-Román, Juan Manuel
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-08T08:30:10Zeng
dc.date.available2009-01-08T08:30:10Z
dc.date.created2009-01-08
dc.date.issued2009-01-08
dc.description.abstractA minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law ineng
dc.format.mimetypePDFspa
dc.identifier.handlehttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5563spa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5563
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisherBanco de la Repúblicaspa
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.32468/be.546spa
dc.relation.dotechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/005222.htmlspa
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de Trabajospa
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBorradores de Economíaspa
dc.relation.isversionofBorradores de Economía; No. 546
dc.relation.numberBorrador 546spa
dc.relation.repechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/546.htmlspa
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Accesseng
dc.rights.ccAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0eng
dc.rights.disclaimerLas opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.spa
dc.rights.spaAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/eng
dc.source.handleRepecRePEc:bdr:borrec:546spa
dc.subject.jelG23 - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investorseng
dc.subject.jelspaD82 - Información privada y asimétrica; Diseño de mecanismosspa
dc.subject.keywordIncentiveseng
dc.subject.keywordAgency theoryeng
dc.subject.keywordPensionseng
dc.subject.lembFondos de pensiones -- Rendimiento financiero -- Colombiaspa
dc.subject.lembIncentivos financieros -- Colombiaspa
dc.titlePrincipal-agent problem with minimum performance insurance: the case of mandatory individual pension accountsspa
dc.typeWorking Papereng
dc.type.hasversionPublished Versioneng
dc.type.spaDocumentos de trabajospa

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