Principal-agent problem with minimum performance insurance: the case of mandatory individual pension accounts
dc.coverage.sucursal | Bogotá | spa |
dc.creator | Julio-Román, Juan Manuel | |
dc.creator.firma | Julio-Román, Juan Manuel | spa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-08T08:30:10Z | eng |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-08T08:30:10Z | |
dc.date.created | 2009-01-08 | |
dc.date.issued | 2009-01-08 | |
dc.description.abstract | A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in | eng |
dc.format.mimetype | spa | |
dc.identifier.handle | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5563 | spa |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5563 | |
dc.language.iso | spa | spa |
dc.publisher | Banco de la República | spa |
dc.relation.doi | https://doi.org/10.32468/be.546 | spa |
dc.relation.dotec | https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/005222.html | spa |
dc.relation.ispartof | Documentos de Trabajo | spa |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Borradores de Economía | spa |
dc.relation.isversionof | Borradores de Economía; No. 546 | |
dc.relation.number | Borrador 546 | spa |
dc.relation.repec | https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/546.html | spa |
dc.rights.accessRights | Open Access | eng |
dc.rights.cc | Atribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 | eng |
dc.rights.disclaimer | Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva. | spa |
dc.rights.spa | Acceso abierto | spa |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | eng |
dc.source.handleRepec | RePEc:bdr:borrec:546 | spa |
dc.subject.jel | D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory | eng |
dc.subject.jelspa | G23 - Instituciones financieras (excepto bancos); Instrumentos financieros; Inversores institucionales | spa |
dc.subject.keyword | Incentives | eng |
dc.subject.keyword | Agency theory | eng |
dc.subject.keyword | Pensions | eng |
dc.subject.lemb | Fondos de pensiones -- Rendimiento financiero -- Colombia | spa |
dc.subject.lemb | Incentivos financieros -- Colombia | spa |
dc.title | Principal-agent problem with minimum performance insurance: the case of mandatory individual pension accounts | spa |
dc.type | Working Paper | eng |
dc.type.hasversion | Published Version | eng |
dc.type.spa | Documentos de trabajo | spa |