Repository logo
 

Optimal crisis interventions in an open economy with credit constraint

Simple item page
dc.audiencePolicymakerseng
dc.audienceResearcherseng
dc.audienceStudentseng
dc.audienceTeacherseng
dc.coverage.sucursalBogotáspa
dc.creatorParra-Polanía, Julián Andrés
dc.creatorVargas-Riaño, Carmiña Ofelia
dc.creator.firmaJulian A. Parra-Polania
dc.creator.firmaCarmiña O. Vargas
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-27T08:30:10Zeng
dc.date.available2017-03-27T08:30:10Zspa
dc.date.created2017-03-27spa
dc.date.issued2018-02-15spa
dc.description.abstractIn an open-economy model with collateral constraint, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) propose a procyclical policy (it calls for capital controls that are higher during crises than during normal times) that supposedly solves the externality problem that results from the underestimation of the social costs of decentralized debt decisions. We show that such policy does not solve the problem and recall that previous literature has established that a countercyclical tax on debt (positive during normal times and nil during crisis) does. We also show that the externality problem can be solved as well by a countercyclical subsidy on consumption (positive during crises and zero in normal times). The latter result, however, is not a robust policy recommendation because it is not a solution if we remove the assumption that lenders overlook the effect of lump-sum taxes on borrowing capacity.eng
dc.format.extent10 páginasspa
dc.format.mimetypePDFspa
dc.identifier.handlehttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/6301spa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/6301spa
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherBanco de la República de Colombiaspa
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.32468/be.989spa
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de trabajospa
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBorradores de Economíaspa
dc.relation.isversionofBorradores de Economía; No. 989spa
dc.relation.numberBorrador 989spa
dc.relation.repechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/989.htmlspa
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Accesseng
dc.rights.ccAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0eng
dc.rights.disclaimerLas opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.spa
dc.rights.spaAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/eng
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBenigno, G., Chen, H., Otrok, C., Rebucci, A., Young, E. (2016). "Optimal Capital Controls and Real Exchange Rate Policies: A Pecuniary Externality Perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 84(C), pp. 147-165.eng
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBianchi, J. (2011). Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cy-cle, American Economic Review, vol. 101(7), American Economic Association, pp. 3400-3426.eng
dc.source.bibliographicCitationJeanne, O., Korinek, A. (2010). "Excessive Volatility in Capital Flows: A Pigouvian Taxation Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pp. 403-407.eng
dc.source.handleRepecRePEc:bdr:borrec:989spa
dc.subjectRestricción de créditospa
dc.subjectCrisis financieraspa
dc.subjectControles de capitalspa
dc.subjectMacroprudenciaspa
dc.subjectSobreendeudamientospa
dc.subject.jelF34 - International Lending and Debt Problemseng
dc.subject.jelF41 - Open Economy Macroeconomicseng
dc.subject.jelG01 - Financial Criseseng
dc.subject.jelH23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidieseng
dc.subject.jelD62 - Externalitieseng
dc.subject.jelspaD62 - Externalidadesspa
dc.subject.jelspaF34 - Préstamos internacionales y problemas relacionados con la deuda externaspa
dc.subject.jelspaF41 - Macroeconomía de la economía abiertaspa
dc.subject.jelspaG01 - Crisis financieraspa
dc.subject.jelspaH23 - Externalidades; Efectos redistributivos; Impuestos y subvenciones medioambientalesspa
dc.subject.keywordCredit constrainteng
dc.subject.keywordFinancial crisiseng
dc.subject.keywordCapital controlseng
dc.subject.keywordMacroprudentialeng
dc.subject.keywordOverborrowingeng
dc.subject.lembPolítica fiscalspa
dc.subject.lembModelos económicosspa
dc.subject.lembPolítica socialspa
dc.subject.lembImpuestosspa
dc.subject.lembSubsidiosspa
dc.titleOptimal crisis interventions in an open economy with credit constrainteng
dc.typeWorking Papereng
dc.type.hasversionPublished Versioneng
dc.type.spaDocumentos de trabajospa

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
be_989.pdf
Size:
515.73 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
FILE
https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/bitstream/handle/20.500.12134/6301/be_989.pdf
Description:
Borradores de Economía No.989
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download

Collections

Borradores de Economía