Testable restrictions of Nash equilibrium in games with continuous domains

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dc.coverage.sucursalBogotáspa
dc.creatorCarvajal, Andrés
dc.date.accessioned2003-01-18T08:30:10Zeng
dc.date.available2003-01-18T08:30:10Z
dc.date.created2003-01-18
dc.date.issued2003-01-18
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite dateng
dc.format.mimetypePDFspa
dc.identifier.handlehttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5247spa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5247
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisherBanco de la Repúblicaspa
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.32468/be.229spa
dc.relation.dotechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/003555.htmlspa
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de Trabajospa
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBorradores de Economíaspa
dc.relation.isversionofBorradores de Economía; No. 229
dc.relation.numberBorrador 229spa
dc.relation.repechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/229.htmlspa
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Accesseng
dc.rights.ccAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0eng
dc.rights.disclaimerLas opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.spa
dc.rights.spaAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/eng
dc.source.handleRepecRePEc:col:000094:003555spa
dc.subject.jelC92 - Laboratory, Group Behavioreng
dc.subject.jelspaC92 - Laboratorio, comportamiento de grupospa
dc.subject.keywordGame theoryeng
dc.subject.keywordTestable restrictionseng
dc.subject.keywordRevealed preferenceseng
dc.subject.lembTeoría de los juegosspa
dc.subject.lembEquilibrio de Nashspa
dc.subject.lembMatemáticas financierasspa
dc.titleTestable restrictions of Nash equilibrium in games with continuous domainsspa
dc.typeWorking Papereng
dc.type.hasversionPublished Versioneng
dc.type.spaDocumentos de trabajospa

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