Testable restrictions of Nash equilibrium in games with continuous domains

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Borradores de Economía; No. 229

Date published

2003-01-18

Date

2003-01-18

Authors

Carvajal, Andrés

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Document language

spa
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Abstract

This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite dat

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JEL Codes

C72 - Noncooperative Games

Temática

Keywords

Keywords

Game theory , Testable restrictions , Revealed preferences

Citation

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https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5247
 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5247
 https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/229.html
 https://doi.org/10.32468/be.229

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