Macro-prudential policy under moral hazard and financial fragility

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Borradores de Economía; No. 878
Date published
2015-04-10
Date of last update
2015-04-10
Author
Arango-Arango, Carlos Alberto
Valencia-Arana, Oscar Mauricio
Document language
spa
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Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.
Abstract
This paper presents a DSGE model with banks that face moral hazard in management. Banks receive demand deposits and fund investment projects. Banks are subject to potential withdrawals by depositors which may force them into early liquidation of their inv
JEL Codes
G11 - Portfolio Choice; Investment DecisionsO33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion ProcessesD86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
Keywords
DSGE modeling ; Financial frictions ; Moral hazard ; Macro-prudential policies ;
URI
https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/6167
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/6167
https://doi.org/10.32468/be.878
https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/878.html
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/012695.html
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial 4.0.This document has been deposited by the author (s) under the following certificate of deposit