Transparency : can central banks commit to truthful communication?

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Borradores de Economía; No. 711

Date published

2012-05-18

Date

2012-05-18

Authors

Parra-Polanía, Julián Andrés

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ISBN

Document language

spa
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Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.

The opinions contained in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not commit Banco de la República or its Board of Directors.

Abstract

To evaluate whether transparency is beneficial, it is usual to assume that the central bank may choose one of two options, opacity versus truthful communication. However, the monetary policymaker may have incentives to misrepresent private information so

Description

JEL Codes

D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
E52 - Monetary Policy
E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies

Temática

Keywords

Keywords

Central bank announcements , Monetary policy , Transparency

Citation

URI

https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5754
 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5754
 https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/711.html
 https://doi.org/10.32468/be.711

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Esta obra está bajo licencia internacional Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial 4.0.

Este documento ha sido depositado por parte de el(los) autor(es) bajo la siguiente constancia de depósito