Populist policies in the transition to democracy

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Borradores de Economía; No. 349

Date published

2005-09-14

Date

2005-09-14

Authors

Mejía, Daniel
Posada, Carlos Esteban

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ISSN

ISBN

Document language

spa
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Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.

The opinions contained in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not commit Banco de la República or its Board of Directors.

Abstract

This paper develops a political economy model that provides an explanation as for why ruling elites in oligarchic societies may rely on income redistribution to the poor (the masses) in order to prevent them from attempting a revolution. We refer to this

Description

JEL Codes

D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

Temática

Keywords

Keywords

Populism , Oligarchy , Democracy , Conflict , Inequality

Citation

URI

https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5367
 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5367
 https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/349.html
 https://doi.org/10.32468/be.349

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Este documento ha sido depositado por parte de el(los) autor(es) bajo la siguiente constancia de depósito