Institutional efficiency in independent central banking: a communicative matter?

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Borradores de Economía; No. 263
Date published
2003-10-16
Date of last update
2003-10-16
Author
Tognato, Carlo Tognato
Document language
spa
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Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.
Abstract
Political economists have traditionally been indifferent to the communicative construction of money and central banking in the public sphere. It does not matter to them whether monetary affairs are rendered as a rational game over the preservation of the
JEL Codes
E52 - Monetary PolicyF31 - Foreign ExchangeE58 - Central Banks and Their PoliciesE31 - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
Keywords
Political economists ; Central Bank ;
URI
https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5281
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5281
https://doi.org/10.32468/be.263
https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/263.html
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial 4.0.This document has been deposited by the author (s) under the following certificate of deposit