Wage indexation, inflation inertia, and the cost of disinflation
Borradores de Economía; No. 198
Date published
2002-02-16Date of last update
2002-02-16Document language
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Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.
Abstract
Wage increases based on past inflation increase inflation inertia and hence increase the cost of disinflation. Higher central bank credibility and a higher frequency of wage negotiations correspond to lower inflation inertia and a lower cost of disinflati
JEL Codes
E52 - Monetary PolicyE1 - General Aggregative ModelsE17 - General Aggregative Models: Forecasting and Simulation: Models and ApplicationE27 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy: Forecasting and Simulation: Models and ApplicationJ30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Keywords
URI
https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5216https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5216
https://doi.org/10.32468/be.198
https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/198.html
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/003770.html
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