Innovation and Growth under Private Information

Gómez-González, José Eduardo; Valencia-Arana, Oscar Mauricio

Innovation and Growth under Private Information

Download

Borradores de Economía; No. 845

Date published

2014-09-15

Date

2016-05-12

Authors

Gómez-González, José Eduardo
Valencia-Arana, Oscar Mauricio

Document language

spa

Metrics

downloads: 0

abstract_views: 0

Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.

The opinions contained in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not commit Banco de la República or its Board of Directors.

Abstract

We study endogenous growth within a model with occupational choice in which innovators produce ideas, within an asymmetric information framework. Each innovator has private knowledge of their production costs. Developers offer innovators non-linear contract schemes that affect both the number of innovators and the rate of economic growth. Two main results are obtained. First, the equilibrium contract under asymmetric information leads to the selection of highly-talented workers in R&D activities. Second, the growth rate is lower in the private information case when compared to the full-information benchmark due to the existence of an efficiency-rent extraction trade-off.