Present-biased Government, Creative Accounting and a Pitfall in Balanced Budget Rules

De Castro-Valderrama, Marcela

Present-biased Government, Creative Accounting and a Pitfall in Balanced Budget Rules

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Borradores de Economía; No.1183

Date published

2021-12-06

Authors

De Castro-Valderrama, Marcela

Document language

eng

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Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.

The opinions contained in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not commit Banco de la República or its Board of Directors.

Abstract

I propose a general equilibrium model with a quasi-hyperbolic discounting government that optimally decides upon using creative accounting in order to evaluate a balanced budget rule and a debt rule. In that context, I find that a binding balanced budget rule could fail to properly constrain public overindebtedness when government uses creative accounting while a debt rule is effective, since targets are set on total public liabilities. Results suggest that a balanced budget fiscal rule can also deteriorate welfare due to the higher interest rates derived from doing operations under the line, implying future expenditure cuts that are harmful for households, who value public goods and services. A debt rule is also preferred for its capacity to reverse some welfare losses generated by the present-biased government.

Description

En un modelo de equilibrio general con un gobierno que descuenta cuasi-hiperbólicamente se evalúan dos reglas fiscales. Los resultados sugieren que una regla fiscal sobre el balance activa y vinculante no garantiza acotar el crecimiento del endeudamiento público cuando el gobierno puede hacer trucos contables y puede generar mayores pérdidas de bienestar en la economía. Por el otro lado, una regla sobre la deuda es efectiva y logra recuperar parte de la pérdida de bienestar generada por el gobierno que descuenta cuasi-hiperbólicamente.