Assortative matching and the education gap

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Borradores de Economía; No. 427
Date published
2006-12-15
Date of last update
2006-12-15
Author
Peña, Ximena
Document language
spa
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Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.
Abstract
This paper attempts to explain the decrease and reversal of the education gap between males and females. Given a continuum of agents, the education decisions are modelled as an assignment game with endogenous types. In the first stage agents choose their
JEL Codes
C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching TheoryD61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit AnalysisD13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
Keywords
Assortative matching ; Efficiency ; Gender ; Education ;
URI
https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5445
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5445
https://doi.org/10.32468/be.427
https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/427.html
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/002032.html
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial 4.0.This document has been deposited by the author (s) under the following certificate of deposit