2009-01-082009-01-082009-01-082009-01-08https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5563A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law inPDFspaOpen AccessPrincipal-agent problem with minimum performance insurance: the case of mandatory individual pension accountsWorking PaperD86 - Economics of Contract: TheoryD82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism DesignG23 - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional InvestorsIncentivesAgency theoryPensionsFondos de pensiones -- Rendimiento financiero -- ColombiaIncentivos financieros -- ColombiaAcceso abiertoAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0G23 - Instituciones financieras (excepto bancos); Instrumentos financieros; Inversores institucionalesD86 - Economía de los contratos: teoríaD82 - Información privada y asimétrica; Diseño de mecanismosLas opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5563