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dc.creatorGómez-González, José Eduardo
dc.creatorValencia-Arana, Oscar Mauricio
dc.date.created2014-09-15
dc.date.issued2016-05-12
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/6132
dc.description.abstractWe study endogenous growth within a model with occupational choice in which innovators produce ideas, within an asymmetric information framework. Each innovator has private knowledge of their production costs. Developers offer innovators non-linear contract schemes that affect both the number of innovators and the rate of economic growth. Two main results are obtained. First, the equilibrium contract under asymmetric information leads to the selection of highly-talented workers in R&D activities. Second, the growth rate is lower in the private information case when compared to the full-information benchmark due to the existence of an efficiency-rent extraction trade-off.
dc.format.mimetypePDF
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherBanco de la República
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de Trabajo
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBorradores de Economía
dc.relation.isversionofBorradores de Economía; No. 845
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Access
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.titleInnovation and Growth under Private Information
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.subject.jelO31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
dc.subject.jelD82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
dc.subject.jelO33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
dc.subject.keywordAdverse selection
dc.subject.keywordInnovation
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous growth
dc.subject.lembInnovadores -- Costos de producción
dc.subject.lembDesarrollo económico
dc.subject.lembCrecimiento endógeno (Economía)
dc.type.spaDocumentos de trabajo
dc.rights.spaAcceso abierto
dc.rights.ccAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
dc.subject.jelspaO31 - Innovación e invención: procesos e incentivos
dc.subject.jelspaO33 - Cambio tecnológico: opciones y consecuencias; Difusión
dc.subject.jelspaD82 - Información privada y asimétrica; Diseño de mecanismos
dc.type.hasversionPublished Version
dc.coverage.sucursalBogotá
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.32468/be.845
dc.rights.disclaimerLas opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.
dc.relation.repechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/845.html
dc.relation.dotechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/012169.html
dc.identifier.handlehttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/6132
dc.source.handleRepecRePEc:bdr:borrec:845
dc.source.handleRepecRePEc:col:000094:012169


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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial 4.0.This document has been deposited by the author (s) under the following certificate of deposit