dc.creator	Gómez-González, José Eduardo
dc.creator	Valencia-Arana, Oscar Mauricio
dc.date.created	2014-09-15
dc.date.issued	2016-05-12
dc.identifier.uri	https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/6132
dc.description.abstract	We study endogenous growth within a model with occupational choice in which innovators produce ideas, within an asymmetric information framework. Each innovator has private knowledge of their production costs. Developers offer innovators non-linear contract schemes that affect both the number of innovators and the rate of economic growth. Two main results are obtained. First, the equilibrium contract under asymmetric information leads to the selection of highly-talented workers in R&D activities. Second, the growth rate is lower in the private information case when compared to the full-information benchmark due to the existence of an efficiency-rent extraction trade-off.
dc.format.mimetype	PDF
dc.language.iso	spa
dc.publisher	Banco de la República
dc.relation.ispartof	Documentos de Trabajo
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Borradores de Economía
dc.relation.isversionof	Borradores de Economía; No. 845
dc.rights.accessRights	Open Access
dc.rights.uri	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.title	Innovation and Growth under Private Information
dc.type	Working Paper
dc.subject.jel	O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
dc.subject.jel	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
dc.subject.jel	O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
dc.subject.keyword	Adverse selection
dc.subject.keyword	Innovation
dc.subject.keyword	Endogenous growth
dc.subject.lemb	Innovadores -- Costos de producción
dc.subject.lemb	Desarrollo económico
dc.subject.lemb	Crecimiento endógeno (Economía)
dc.type.spa	Documentos de trabajo
dc.rights.spa	Acceso abierto
dc.rights.cc	Atribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
dc.subject.jelspa	O31 - Innovación e invención: procesos e incentivos
dc.subject.jelspa	O33 - Cambio tecnológico: opciones y consecuencias; Difusión
dc.subject.jelspa	D82 - Información privada y asimétrica; Diseño de mecanismos
dc.type.hasversion	Published Version
dc.coverage.sucursal	Bogotá
dc.relation.doi	https://doi.org/10.32468/be.845
dc.rights.disclaimer	Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.
dc.relation.repec	https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/845.html
dc.relation.dotec	https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/012169.html
dc.identifier.handle	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/6132
dc.source.handleRepec	RePEc:bdr:borrec:845
dc.source.handleRepec	RePEc:col:000094:012169

Innovation and Growth under Private Information

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