Populist policies in the transition to democracy
Borradores de Economía; No. 349
Date published
2005-09-14Date of last update
2005-09-14Document language
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Las opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.
Abstract
This paper develops a political economy model that provides an explanation as for why ruling elites in oligarchic societies may rely on income redistribution to the poor (the masses) in order to prevent them from attempting a revolution. We refer to this
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https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5367https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5367
https://doi.org/10.32468/be.349
https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/349.html
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/003357.html
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