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dc.creatorTognato, Carlo Tognato
dc.description.abstractPolitical economists have traditionally been indifferent to the communicative construction of money and central banking in the public sphere. It does not matter to them whether monetary affairs are rendered as a rational game over the preservation of the
dc.publisherBanco de la República
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de Trabajo
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBorradores de Economía
dc.relation.isversionofBorradores de Economía; No. 263
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Access
dc.titleInstitutional efficiency in independent central banking: a communicative matter?
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.subject.jelE52 - Monetary Policy
dc.subject.jelF31 - Foreign Exchange
dc.subject.jelE58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
dc.subject.jelE31 - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
dc.subject.keywordPolitical economists
dc.subject.keywordCentral Bank
dc.subject.lembBancos centrales
dc.subject.lembBancos centrales -- Independencia
dc.subject.lembRendimiento industrial
dc.subject.lembPolítica monetaria
dc.type.spaDocumentos de trabajo
dc.rights.spaAcceso abierto
dc.rights.ccAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
dc.subject.jelspaE58 - Bancos centrales y sus políticas
dc.subject.jelspaE52 - Política monetaria
dc.subject.jelspaE31 - Nivel de precios; Inflación; Deflación
dc.subject.jelspaF31 - Tipos de cambio
dc.type.hasversionPublished Version
dc.rights.disclaimerLas opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.

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