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# The Elusive Domestic Revolution: Time Use and Gender Roles in Colombia *

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**Abstract**

This study examines the historical transformations in time use and gender roles in Colombia throughout the 20th century and their persistence in contemporary patterns. Drawing on census microdata and the 2016–2017 and 2020–2021 National Time Use Surveys, we document the evolution of paid and unpaid work across five generations of women and men. The findings confirm a swift increase in female labour force participation, particularly among highly educated women. However, the redistribution of household care lags, with perceptions of gender roles and social norms persisting. While women have succeeded in gaining a space in the public sphere, the division of unpaid work remains unequal, especially when kids are present in the household. Our analysis highlights the need for broader societal and policy interventions to address these structural disparities.

***Keywords***: *Gender, social norms, paid work, non-paid work, time-use.*
**JEL Classification**: J16, J22, J13.

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# La Esquiva Revolución Doméstica: Uso del Tiempo y Roles de Género en Colombia [*]

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**Resumen**

Este estudio examina las transformaciones históricas en el uso del tiempo y los roles de género en Colombia a lo largo del siglo XX, así como su persistencia hoy en día. A partir de microdatos censales y de las Encuestas Nacionales de Uso del Tiempo 2016–2017 y 2020–2021, documentamos la evolución del trabajo remunerado y no remunerado en cinco generaciones de mujeres y hombres. Los resultados muestran un rápido incremento en la participación femenina en el mercado laboral, particularmente entre las mujeres con mayores niveles educativos. Sin embargo, la redistribución de las responsabilidades de cuidado doméstico avanza a un ritmo más lento, con percepciones tradicionales sobre los roles de género y normas sociales que persisten en el tiempo, sobre todo cuando hay niños en el hogar. Nuestro análisis sugiere que aún se requieren intervenciones sociales y de política pública para enfrentar estas desigualdades estructurales.

***Palabras clave**: Género, normas sociales, trabajo remunerado, trabajo no remunerado, uso del tiempo.*
**Clasificación JEL**: J16, J22, J13.

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# 1 Introduction

In the 20th century, Colombia underwent significant social transformations, particularly in terms of gender. Women in the country transitioned from a regime of high fertility, low enrollment rates in education, and low labor participation to a regime of low fertility, in which women's enrollment in higher education surpassed that of men, and their labor participation continued to increase (Iregui-Bohórquez, Melo-Becerra, Ramírez-Giraldo, & Tribín-Uribe, 2021). The socioeconomic transformations affected time allocation within the family, with caregiving services potentially shifting from family members to paid care workers (England, 2005; Cortés & Pan, 2019) and female-led home production hours declining (Vidart, 2024). These changes impacted women differently based on their urban or rural location, education levels, and generation (Peña & Uribe, 2013; Moreno-Salamanca, 2018). The transformation of women's roles has been extensively examined in the United States and Europe (Ruggles, 2015; Goldin, 2006; Fernández, Fogli, & Olivetti, 2004; Olivetti, Pan, & Petrongolo, 2024). But historical evidence of these changes is limited for most Latin American countries, including Colombia, although some exceptions should be highlighted such as the work of Chioda (2016) and Iregui-Bohórquez et al. (2021).

Despite women's rapid advancement in education and the workforce, men's participation in domestic and caregiving duties lags, leading to a significant imbalance in household responsibility distribution and time use. This discrepancy raises questions about the equitable sharing of domestic duties between partners. While women have made strides in both professional and domestic spheres, societal norms and male engagement in these changes are still evolving (Gutiérrez de Pineda, 1987; Olivetti et al., 2024). Nonetheless, it is still an open question whether the ongoing social progress, fueled by educational advances, fairer laws, and increased female workforce involvement, has led to a more balanced sharing of household and caregiving tasks across genders.

Our paper compares changes in gender roles related to domestic duties, examining how these have evolved across time by looking at five generations of women and men. We track changes in fertility, education, main occupation, and the share of women and men who declare to be the head of the household in the censuses from 1964 to 2018. Then, we examine current trends in time use by following the same generations of women and men in the 2016-2017 and 2020-2021 National Time Use Surveys (ENUT). With the survey data, we aim to describe how the perception of gender roles and the use of time differ – or do not – across generations

and between men and women, paying particular attention to how education affects social norms and women's use of time.

Our analysis reveals significant transformations in Colombian women's roles and time use across generations, with educational attainment playing a pivotal role. Women's labor force participation has increased sharply, particularly among highly educated women; for instance, the percentage of women with university degrees jumped from less than 1% for the Silent Generation to nearly 24% for Millennials. This rise in education correlates with a decline in fertility, as we observe a reduction from an average of over six children per woman in the Silent Generation to fewer than two for Millennials by their thirties. However, the redistribution of unpaid domestic work has not kept pace with economic empowerment. The National Time Use Survey shows that, on average, working women still dedicate between 4 and 6 hours per day to unpaid work, while men contribute half the amount. Despite increasing educational attainment and labor participation, women still assume a larger portion of household care duties, reflecting a traditional gender division. In terms of gender beliefs, most women across all generations continue to agree that "women are better at housework than men", but there is a strong education gradient that reflects the fact that higher educated women are less likely to agree with such a statement. This demonstrates the persistence of gender norms, but it also shows the role of education in breaking such beliefs.

Overall, the literature suggests that advances in education, evolving societal norms, and the adoption of time-saving household technologies have played pivotal roles in this transformation. As women entered the workforce, their perspectives and norms transformed, enabling them to envision careers rather than just jobs (Goldin, 2006), in Colombia, however, the pace of change has been uneven. While certain gender norms have adapted, others remain deeply entrenched. This persistence partly reflects the slow-moving nature of cultural attitudes toward gender roles (Alesina, Giuliano, & Nunn, 2013) and the enduring influence of religion on social values. A prominent example is the expectation of women to assume caregiving roles within families. A study by Jayachandran (2021) indicates that social norms can have a strong impact on gender roles in societies where religious beliefs are deeply ingrained. In Colombia, Catholicism has traditionally upheld gender expectations, which are often slow to change even in urbanized, secular settings. Hence, religion may play a pivotal role in defining societal norms around caregiving and household roles.

Our research in Colombia aligns with global findings, showing a swift increase in women's

participation in the labor force and evolving social norms towards economic empowerment. However, progress within households unfolds at a slower pace. This uneven progress underscores a situation where women continue to face a lag in transforming domestic roles despite making strides in the professional realm (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Salazar-Saenz, 2024). This illustrates the need for more balanced gender norms across public and, crucially, across private spheres.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we review the relevant literature, followed by a detailed overview of the Colombian social and economic context. The fourth section discusses our data sources, and the fifth section presents the results. The final section concludes.

## 2 Review of Literature

Research in time use patterns has predominantly focused on the historical evolution of time allocation across the labor market, domestic, and care work, with particular attention given to the rise in female labor force participation during the $20^{\text{th}}$ century. Studies conducted in the US attribute this rise to numerous factors, including the diffusion of oral contraceptives and the delay of childbirth (Goldin & Katz, 2002), technological advances in maternal health (Albanesi & Olivetti, 2007), and the increased availability of durable goods like home appliances (Greenwood, Seshadri, & Yorukoglu, 2005; Vidart, 2024). Other significant factors contributing to the notable increase in female labor force participation comprise structural transformations in the economy and the growth in the service sector (Goldin, 1994; Ngai, Olivetti, & Petrongolo, 2024; Iregui-Bohórquez, Melo-Becerra, Ramírez-Giraldo, Tribín-Uribe, & Zárate-Solano, 2024), regulatory changes (Haddad & Kattan, 2024), and changes in social norms (Goldin, 1988; Alesina et al., 2013; Iregui-Bohórquez et al., 2024).

Additional research on time use patterns in the US reveals that men and women spend time more similarly today than in the 1960s and 1970s, but this is because women have changed their time use patterns more than men have changed theirs (Sayer, 2016). A study by Kan, Sullivan, and Gershuny (2011) investigates the gender time use gap in domestic work across 16 developed countries since the 1960s. Their findings indicate a slow and incomplete gender convergence in both work time and the division of domestic labor. The authors attribute this gradual convergence to persistent gender segregation in domestic work. Despite progress, women continue to shoulder the majority of routine household chores, while men disproportionately increase their contribution to non-routine domestic work. Similar

historical patterns are evident in childcare. Although fathers have spent more time with their children in Germany since the 1990s, women still take on more than three-quarters of weekday childcare responsibilities (Steinbach & Schulz, 2022).

Research has also indicated that despite a shift in social norms regarding gender roles, cultural norms related to gender can exhibit lasting tendencies over time (Alesina et al., 2013). During the 1970s, attitudes toward married women experienced a rapid transformation. Initially, the prevailing notion was that wives should stay at home. Nevertheless, as women's labor force participation increased by the 1980s, most married women approved of married women working (Ruggles, 2015). However, gender expectations continue to play a role in shaping the time allocated to unpaid work. Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) show that in the US, the gender gap in non-market work is more significant if the wife earns more than the husband, probably because women want to offset the violation of the social norm that takes men as the leading provider. This is known in the literature as the gender deviance hypothesis.

In Colombia, the analysis of care economics is recent (López Montaño, Rodríguez Enríquez, Rey de Marulanda, & Ocampo, 2015; López, n.d.; Salazar-Díaz, 2022a). Research shows a critical gender gap in unpaid work hours of around three hours between men and women and highlights that the gap is larger once educational attainment is considered (Monroy & Olarte, 2012; Moreno, 2018; Tovar & Urdinola, 2019). Another strand of the literature uses the time use survey estimates in complex theoretical and empirical models. For instance, Salazar-Saenz (2024) constructs a household search model for modeling time allocation to market activities and household production, finding that differences in home production between spouses contribute substantially to the gender participation gap. On the other hand, similar to Bertrand et al. (2015), Salazar-Díaz (2022b) shows that the unpaid domestic work gap increases in households where women's income exceeds that of men. The author attributes this phenomenon to an increase in the time women dedicate to core domestic work, subsequently reducing their leisure time. These findings suggest that women intensify their involvement in unpaid domestic work to offset gender role deviations when they earn more than their partners, which is consistent with the gender deviance neutralization hypothesis.

Despite the undeniable importance of economic development in narrowing gender gaps, research emphasizes that social norms continue to play a significant role in explaining these disparities. Jayachandran (2021) illustrates that variations in female labor participation

between countries with similar levels of development can be attributed to prevailing social norms. Moreover, misperception of gender norms has the potential to impede the trajectory toward gender equality (Bursztyn, Cappelen, Tungodden, Voena, & Yanagizawa-Drott, 2023). While specific social gender-related standards have changed, such as a reduced tolerance for intimate partner violence, persistent perceptions linger, particularly regarding women being primarily responsible for household and childcare duties (Jayachandran, 2021). The presence of traditional gender roles can also adversely affect women's earnings and decrease their likelihood of being employed (Zhang & Wang, 2021).

Regarding shifting societal norms, Galindo-Silva and Herrera-Idárraga (2023) find that women cohorts exposed to mandatory school courses promoted by the Colombian constitution from 1991, which integrated gender equality in its core, exhibited higher labor market participation than those not exposed.

Cultural transmission mechanisms reinforce the persistence of gender norms. Stereotypes and societal expectations around gender roles are passed down and reproduced within families, communities, and institutions. The cultural power of these norms is so strong that even in the presence of policies aimed at reducing gender inequality, attitudes and behaviors can lag, thereby reinforcing these disparities over time (Schmitz & Spiess, 2022). These norms act as a common-knowledge framework that shapes everyday interactions, carrying traditional views into various spheres of life, including work, family, and social structures. This persistence is not just rooted in outdated beliefs but is constantly recreated through daily interpersonal exchanges and assumptions about gender roles (Ridgeway, 2011).

# 3 Background: Social and Economic Advances of Women in Colombia during the 20th Century

The understanding of women's roles in education, work, and households in Colombia in the 19$^{th}$ century is limited. However, research such as that by Aguilera-Díaz and Meisel-Roca (2007), analyzing the 1875 Cartagena census, has offered valuable insights. The authors found that about 52% of the population lived in female-headed households, suggesting a high prevalence of such households.[1] The study also highlighted a gender gap in education: around 30% of women attended school compared to 56% of men. Regarding occupations,

[1]Cartagena stands out with a notably high ratio of women. For further discussion, see Aguilera-Díaz and Meisel-Roca (2007).

96% of women were reported as engaged in domestic administration, with only 1% in crafts. In contrast, 36% of men were craftsmen, and just 3% participated in domestic administration. However, it is likely that women were involved in diverse activities, but social norms of the time led them to report household work primarily. Our findings indicate that this trend continued into the mid-20$^{th}$ century, reflecting persistent gender role conventions.

In the 20$^{th}$ century, the fight for equality began in 1920 when female workers in the textile industry initiated mobilizations to improve their working conditions and fight for the right to labor dignity. Among other demands, they advocated for using footwear during work hours and equal pay compared to male workers. In the 1930s, access to higher education was achieved, starting timidly for women but reaching parity in admissions in the 1980s, although biases still existed regarding the choice of careers. In the 1940s, the fight was more subdued, perhaps due to the country's climate of violence. The high internal migration mobilized entire families to urban centers, where general social demands such as education, housing, and public services were concentrated, rather than specifically gender-related issues.

In the 1950s, due to external factors (women's rights) and internal factors (a weak political system), women were granted the right to vote. However, it was believed that the control over that decision would still rest with the priests or the men in the families, casting doubt on women's ability to exercise that right. In other words, women gained rights, but social norms questioned their ability to use this political right correctly. From the 1960s onwards, the feminist movement began to gain strength in universities, among workers, and on the streets. The demands focused on rights to economic autonomy in their private lives, aiming to break the taboo of divorce and remove the prefix "de" (meaning that the woman's last name is associated with the husband's last name as a kind of property) from their civil registries. Alongside these demands, there were calls for greater access to higher-skilled positions in the workforce and the ability to manage their resources in a financial system that viewed this with suspicion (such as administering credit or buying a house, for example).

By the late 1980s, it was evident that the quest for equality was not being reflected in the political sphere, with meager participation of women in elected positions (mayors, senators, municipal councils, among others) and almost no representation in appointed public positions. A political change process concluded with the Constitution of 1991, replacing the previous constitution that had lasted for over 100 years and was of a conservative character. Although only four out of 70 constituent members were women involved in its drafting, the

right to equality and non-discrimination (Article 7) was included in the text, marking a historical change favoring the most vulnerable groups, including women.

However, despite the constitutional change, the appointment of women in high-level public positions was not usual, leading to the pursuit of a quota law. The debate was intense, with conflicting situations. On one side, women academics, lawyers, and experts expressed the need for affirmative action to change established cultural norms against women's participation. Conversely, male academics defended the status quo, treating it as a natural order that would gradually adjust over the long term. They argued that enforcing women's participation through quotas would favor them without concrete merits.

Iregui-Bohórquez et al. (2021) provide a comprehensive overview of gender social and structural transformation in Colombia throughout the $20^{\text{th}}$ century. Their study built and analyzed sociodemographic, education, labor force participation, and political representation indicators. Noteworthy advancements are observed in educational attainment and sociodemographic indicators, such as reduced fertility rates. However, persistent barriers in political representation and female labor force participation remain. Additional studies show significant improvements in living standards in the twentieth century, including health and education, especially for women (Jaramillo-Echeverri, Meisel-Roca, & Ramírez-Giraldo, 2019). Furthermore, Amador, Bernal, and Peña (2013) identify a notable increase in living standards from 1984 to 2006, primarily driven by the increased participation of married or cohabiting women with lower educational attainment in the labor market. Similarly, Arango and Posada (2007) show that the determinants of labor participation of married women between 1984 and 2000 depended on past participation decisions, education level, labor income taxes, children aged between 1 and 2 years old, and the presence of other unemployed people at home.

This paper expands on Iregui-Bohórquez et al. (2021), detailing the journey of Colombian women towards economic and social equality. We focus on studying the gender division of time devoted to unpaid work within the household for women and men who actively participate in paid work and compare how this division has changed in relation to broader socioeconomic transformations. In particular, we compare shifts in time allocated to household production with key developments such as rising female labor force participation, changes in working hours in paid activities, and gains in educational attainment. Our analysis follows five generations of women and men, as defined in Table 1.

Table 1: Definition of cohorts and care responsibilities in 2025

| Cohort | Year of birth | Characteristics | Care responsibilities in 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Silent Generation | 1900 to 1935 | Very high fertility and infant and maternal mortality rates, low enrollment rates in primary and secondary education and no access to higher education. | Mostly dependent on family members for care. Care responsibilities are often transferred to daughters or paid caregivers. |
| High Fertility and Low Labour Force | 1936 to 1964 | High fertility and high marriage rates at young ages persisted, female labor participation continued to be limited. Women achieved the right to vote and to be elected. | Still heavily involved in unpaid care within extended households. Many women care for grandchildren, ill spouses, or elderly relatives. |
| Gen X | 1965 to 1980 | Decline in fertility rates accompanied by reduced infant mortality and access to contraceptive methods. Greater education for women and an increase in labor market participation. | Balancing paid work with unpaid care, mainly childcare and eldercare. |
| Millennials | 1981 to 1996 | Steady increase in female enrollment in higher education, exceeding that of men; fertility and mortality rates continued reducing, and women's labor participation kept growing. | Need for substantial time on childcare and household management. |
| Gen Z | 1997 to 2010 | Fertility rates achieved below replacement levels, women were still more educated than men but labor participation stagnated. Gaps in income and informality between men and women persisted. | Many still live with parents and share household chores. |

Notes: Cohort definitions based on Iregui-Bohórquez et al. (2021). Care responsibilities are based on ENUT 2016–2017 and 2020–2021 data, combined with authors' analysis.

# 4 Data

Due to the lack of systematic historical information on time use and the perception of gender roles, we base our analysis on two main sources. We use national censuses and the national survey of time use. In this section, we describe both sources.

## 4.1 Censuses

Colombia has a well-established reputation for the reliability and comprehensiveness of its census efforts (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), 2024). This tradition, dating back to 1820, has yielded a valuable dataset that enables the examination of long-term trends in fertility, education, women's labor force participation, marital status and more. We use six national censuses spanning multiple decades in Colombia, from 1964 to 2018. Representative samples from the 1964, 1973, 1985, and 2005 censuses were gathered through IPUMS-International (IPUMS, 2022). For 2018, we used the complete census available through DANE.

As shown in Table 2, the number of children per woman has steadily decreased across generations. Women with completed fertility, defined as those older than 45 years, went from having an average of 6 children in the Silent Generation to having 3 children in Generation X. Additionally, it can be inferred that the average age of the mother at childbirth has increased over generations, with Millennials delaying childbirth significantly compared to their High Fertility and Generation X counterparts.

Other changes are also evident in the educational attainment of women. Over the years, there has been a decline in the number of women with less than primary schooling, while

the proportion of women who have completed university has risen. For instance, according to the 2018 census, 24% of Millennials had completed a university degree, compared to less than 10% of women from the High Fertility generation. Additionally, the censuses indicate a gradual increase in the percentage of women recognized as heads of households. Among women who were 30 years old at the time of each census, only 11% of those from the high fertility and low labor generation were heads of households, compared to nearly 27% from the Millennial generation. Similar changes can be seen for men in Table 3.

The censuses provide a way to observe differences across multiple generations. However, comparing individuals at different stages of their life cycle can be challenging. To address this issue, for the following exercises based on census data, we will be comparing people aged 30 to 39 at the time of each census. This approach allows us to analyze individuals at the same life stage, after they have completed their education. We chose a 10-year interval because the censuses are conducted approximately every 10 years, and we want to avoid overlap in the sample. For this reason, we cannot include results based on census data for Generation Z, the youngest generation in our analysis, as they were born between 1997 and 2010. Thus, at the time of the 2018 census, they were not 30 years old yet.

Table 2: Summary statistics for women in the censuses, 1964-2018

| Year | Avg Age | Avg Child | Less Than Primary (%) | Primary Completed (%) | Secondary Completed (%) | University Completed (%) | Head of Household (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Silent Generation** | | | | | | | |
| 1964 | 42.18 | - | 77.85 | 20.92 | 1.07 | 0.17 | 20.62 |
| 1973 | 50.35 | 6.16 | 71.90 | 25.34 | 2.47 | 0.29 | 29.31 |
| 1985 | 61.11 | 6.10 | 65.89 | 28.76 | 4.64 | 0.71 | 33.32 |
| 1993 | 67.85 | 6.03 | 61.78 | 31.44 | 6.45 | 0.33 | 37.84 |
| 2005 | 77.08 | 6.13 | 73.79 | 21.71 | 3.55 | 0.95 | 45.57 |
| 2018 | 89.45 | 6.56 | 26.83 | 55.27 | 15.43 | 2.47 | 44.01 |
| **High Fertility and Low Labour** | | | | | | | |
| 1964 | 11.56 | - | 83.22 | 16.00 | 0.69 | 0.09 | 1.71 |
| 1973 | 20.00 | 2.31 | 64.57 | 31.55 | 3.39 | 0.49 | 6.42 |
| 1985 | 31.94 | 2.96 | 38.84 | 41.25 | 15.67 | 4.24 | 11.56 |
| 1993 | 39.93 | 3.56 | 37.43 | 40.81 | 20.58 | 1.17 | 20.37 |
| 2005 | 52.28 | 3.98 | 49.88 | 31.56 | 12.24 | 6.32 | 32.57 |
| 2018 | 65.53 | 3.98 | 11.45 | 46.56 | 32.47 | 9.52 | 47.49 |
| **Gen X** | | | | | | | |
| 1973 | 4.20 | - | 100.00 | - | - | - | 0.04 |
| 1985 | 12.56 | 0.27 | 60.98 | 35.01 | 3.93 | 0.08 | 0.42 |
| 1993 | 20.31 | 0.87 | 22.36 | 56.76 | 20.44 | 0.44 | 3.90 |
| 2005 | 32.26 | 2.23 | 26.68 | 36.18 | 28.24 | 8.90 | 17.09 |
| 2018 | 46.94 | 2.79 | 4.34 | 28.94 | 50.97 | 15.76 | 40.24 |
| **Millennials** | | | | | | | |
| 1985 | 2.10 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.01 |
| 1993 | 6.09 | 0.01 | 86.28 | 13.72 | - | - | - |
| 2005 | 16.02 | 0.41 | 28.29 | 51.35 | 18.72 | 1.63 | 3.17 |
| 2018 | 29.13 | 1.93 | 1.87 | 10.35 | 63.94 | 23.84 | 26.80 |

Sources: Authors' calculations based on 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Census samples from IPUMS-International and 2018 full census from DANE.

Table 3: Summary statistics for men in the censuses, 1964-2018

| Year | Avg Age | Less Than Primary (%) | Primary Completed (%) | Secondary Completed (%) | University Completed (%) | Head of Household (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Silent Generation** | | | | | | |
| 1964 | 40.94 | 75.45 | 20.73 | 2.21 | 1.6 | 85.80 |
| 1973 | 49.37 | 69.7 | 25.01 | 3.11 | 2.17 | 85.44 |
| 1985 | 60.37 | 62.77 | 28.89 | 5.24 | 3.09 | 87.62 |
| 1993 | 67.21 | 62.54 | 28.49 | 8.1 | 0.87 | 87.62 |
| 2005 | 76.78 | 75.52 | 19.16 | 3.13 | 2.19 | 79.99 |
| 2018 | 89.31 | 26.68 | 53.93 | 13.54 | 9.66 | 63.76 |
| **High Fertility and Low Labour** | | | | | | |
| 1964 | 11.11 | 84.28 | 14.17 | 1.26 | 0.29 | 6.53 |
| 1973 | 19.61 | 64.68 | 29.89 | 4.08 | 1.36 | 22.60 |
| 1985 | 32.18 | 38.52 | 39.52 | 15.64 | 6.32 | 59.47 |
| 1993 | 40.08 | 37.48 | 39.12 | 21.55 | 1.85 | 77.31 |
| 2005 | 52.3 | 51.45 | 30.62 | 11.29 | 6.64 | 83.04 |
| 2018 | 65.26 | 12.0 | 45.66 | 30.48 | 11.85 | 75.94 |
| **Gen X** | | | | | | |
| 1973 | 4.18 | - | - | - | - | 0.11 |
| 1985 | 12.26 | 100 | - | - | - | 0.98 |
| 1993 | 20.12 | 26.5 | 55.7 | 17.47 | 0.33 | 17.77 |
| 2005 | 32.26 | 31.16 | 37.18 | 24.26 | 7.4 | 63.93 |
| 2018 | 43.99 | 4.73 | 29.44 | 50.1 | 15.73 | 68.07 |
| **Millennials** | | | | | | |
| 1985 | 2.09 | - | - | - | - | 0.01 |
| 1993 | 6.08 | 87.97 | 12.03 | - | - | - |
| 2005 | 15.85 | 34.26 | 49.7 | 14.95 | 1.1 | 7.53 |
| 2018 | 29.37 | 2.52 | 14.57 | 63.21 | 19.7 | 47.68 |

Sources: Authors' calculations based on 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Census samples from IPUMS-International and 2018 full census from DANE.

Table 2 and Table 3 confirm clear cohort shifts in both education and household roles. Across successive generations, the share with less than primary schooling declines sharply, while secondary and university completion expand steadily for both women and men. Headship remains consistently higher among men, above 70 percent in most cohorts, whereas women's headship rises more gradually, reaching about one quarter of Millennials. These patterns provide the baseline for examining how educational expansion and demographic transitions intersect with time use and gendered divisions of labor in later sections.

## 4.2 National Survey of Time Use (ENUT)

Our analysis uses the 2016-2017 and 2020-2021 waves of the National Time Use Survey to examine the distribution of time devoted to paid and unpaid work, alongside gender attitudes, across different generations of women in Colombia and compare it to men in certain scenarios. The ENUT survey aims to characterize how individuals, aged 10 and over, allocate their time to paid work, unpaid work, and personal activities, with data collected triennially across diverse regions including urban and rural areas. The samples of the 2016-2017 and 2020-2021 waves of the National Time Use Survey featured 44,999 and 49,519 households, respectively (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), 2022). The survey categorizes time use into three main dimensions: paid work (as defined by the National Accounts System), personal activities (education, social and cultural activities, hobbies, media usage, personal care, and religious activities), and unpaid work (activities outside the National Accounts System, such as household chores and caregiving).

As this document examines the time dedicated to both paid and unpaid work among women and men from the aforementioned generations, we only include in our sample people who engage in market activities in order to obtain results specific to the women and men we want to analyze, making them comparable. Thus, our sample (without applying the expansion factor) consists of women aged 15 or older [2] who spend at least 1 hour per day, on average, on unpaid work activities and who also dedicate at least 1 hour per day, on average, to paid work. In this regard, we classify them as women who are actively participating in the labor market. Additionally, as this survey measures passive caregiving activities, i.e., activities performed simultaneously, such as cooking while also caring for a third party, and in some cases, the reported hours can exceed 24 hours per day, we capped the hours to 24 to ensure that the sum of hours dedicated to unpaid work does not exceed this value. We also include

[2] 15 years is the minimum age to work in Colombia according to DANE.

men in the sample, who satisfy the same conditions of working at least one hour in unpaid work and at least one hour in paid activities and who are 15 years or older, in order to have another comparison group.

Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of certain socioeconomic variables such as age, the percentage of women and men who declare to be household heads, marital status, the percentage of women and men with children living in her house (which is different from the number of children the women had), educational level (no education, primary school degree, high school degree or higher education degree), and reported labor income (in current pesos), for women and men aged 15 or older. Men of each generation declare to be head of the household in a higher proportion than women while the most striking differences come from the fact that women more frequently attain higher education degrees than men, and the reported labor income of men is higher across all generations.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics based on ENUT of women and men aged 15 or over by generation who are active in the labor market

Panel A: 2016–2017

| | (1) Gen Z | | (2) Millennials | | (3) Gen X | | (4) High Fertility and Low LFP | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male |
| Age | 18.82 | 18.60 | 29.37 | 29.07 | 43.75 | 43.68 | 58.96 | 60.53 |
| Head of household (%) | 10.46 | 17.38 | 25.45 | 60.38 | 40.88 | 79.56 | 54.32 | 84.95 |
| *Marital status* | | | | | | | | |
| Single (%) | 62.96 | 75.31 | 25.33 | 25.76 | 12.90 | 11.41 | 11.52 | 10.80 |
| Married (%) | 29.63 | 23.43 | 57.45 | 69.44 | 62.53 | 76.40 | 61.35 | 71.49 |
| Divorced (%) | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.17 | 0.05 | 0.25 | 0.12 | 0.27 | 0.18 |
| *Children at home* | | | | | | | | |
| No children (%) | 53.16 | 46.10 | 40.17 | 41.72 | 43.80 | 40.02 | 87.94 | 79.27 |
| 1 child (%) | 29.19 | 31.99 | 29.60 | 30.86 | 32.72 | 27.46 | 9.27 | 14.04 |
| 2 children (%) | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.22 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.23 | 0.02 | 0.04 |
| 3 or more children (%) | 0.05 | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| *Education* | | | | | | | | |
| Less than primary (%) | 0.22 | 0.76 | 0.69 | 1.40 | 1.81 | 3.62 | 7.37 | 12.15 |
| Primary (%) | 3.27 | 12.85 | 7.90 | 12.81 | 21.48 | 28.07 | 39.33 | 43.85 |
| Secondary (%) | 65.36 | 74.56 | 46.65 | 54.25 | 45.45 | 43.02 | 33.76 | 28.15 |
| Bachelor degree (%) | 31.15 | 11.84 | 41.65 | 29.12 | 27.24 | 21.38 | 15.90 | 12.65 |
| Postgraduate degree (%) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.11 | 2.42 | 4.02 | 3.91 | 3.64 | 3.19 |
| Income (COP) | 484,532.24 | 534,312.01 | 824,194.32 | 978,074.04 | 808,779.22 | 1,074,899.34 | 655,528.69 | 837,133.94 |
| Observations | 459 | 397 | 5,760 | 4,293 | 5,690 | 3,733 | 3,516 | 2,750 |

Panel B: 2020–2021

| | (1) Gen Z | | (2) Millennials | | (3) Gen X | | (4) High Fertility and Low LFP | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male |
| Age | 21.51 | 21.49 | 32.79 | 32.56 | 47.44 | 47.66 | 61.90 | 63.37 |
| Head of household (%) | 23.15 | 37.02 | 43.34 | 64.95 | 53.47 | 79.00 | 60.67 | 84.66 |
| *Marital status* | | | | | | | | |
| Single (%) | 55.63 | 60.31 | 27.98 | 26.59 | 18.56 | 16.05 | 16.50 | 13.05 |
| Married (%) | 35.30 | 38.26 | 53.85 | 66.76 | 55.54 | 67.63 | 57.53 | 65.27 |
| Divorced (%) | 9.07 | 1.43 | 18.17 | 6.65 | 25.90 | 16.32 | 25.97 | 21.68 |
| *Children at home* | | | | | | | | |
| No children (%) | 56.16 | 54.68 | 39.23 | 45.71 | 58.95 | 56.58 | 93.19 | 87.88 |
| 1 child (%) | 29.05 | 30.73 | 31.73 | 27.16 | 28.33 | 22.12 | 5.53 | 8.25 |
| 2 children (%) | 11.44 | 10.31 | 22.14 | 19.87 | 10.66 | 15.23 | 0.96 | 2.47 |
| 3 or more children (%) | 3.35 | 4.29 | 6.90 | 7.26 | 2.07 | 6.07 | 0.32 | 1.40 |
| *Education* | | | | | | | | |
| Less than primary (%) | 0.00 | 0.57 | 0.50 | 1.30 | 1.69 | 4.07 | 6.55 | 11.52 |
| Primary (%) | 2.55 | 8.11 | 6.39 | 11.61 | 20.89 | 28.97 | 36.93 | 43.59 |
| Secondary (%) | 57.75 | 67.94 | 40.69 | 47.56 | 38.79 | 39.35 | 29.16 | 26.15 |
| Bachelor degree (%) | 38.64 | 22.81 | 45.75 | 34.35 | 30.93 | 20.42 | 19.96 | 14.41 |
| Postgraduate degree (%) | 1.06 | 0.57 | 6.67 | 5.18 | 7.70 | 7.19 | 7.40 | 4.34 |
| Income (COP) | 754,129.62 | 743,859.84 | 1,181,299.54 | 1,238,045.24 | 1,129,480.36 | 1,263,386.69 | 937,688.77 | 995,222.97 |
| Observations | 1,136 | 1,048 | 6,011 | 4,765 | 4,494 | 3,296 | 1,879 | 2,145 |

Source: ENUT 2016–2017 and 2020–2021, own elaboration.

On average, Millennial and Generation X women constitute the highest shares with children in the household. Across cohorts, women surpass men in university and postgraduate completion. At the same time, men report markedly higher headship rates (often 60–80%) and systematically higher labor incomes across all generations. For instance, in 2020–2021, Millennial men earned on average 5% more than Millennial women, and among Generation X the gap exceeded 10%. Thus, despite convergence in education, persistent gender gaps remain in earnings and household authority. Furthermore, women from the High Fertility and Low Labor Force Participation generation are mostly household heads, which can be explained since women from that generation tend to marry older men and men have lower life expectancy than women.

# 5 Results

In this section, we present detailed descriptive evidence of the socioeconomic changes we observe through generations. First, we focus on historical census data that reveals clear patterns on fertility, education, occupation and position of the woman in the household by looking at four generations of women. Later on, relying on survey data from ENUT, we describe current changes in self-reported perceptions about gender roles across generations and differences in time use by generation and educational level.

## 5.1 Historical patterns

### 5.1.1 Fertility

The patterns of fertility across generations in Colombia reveal a dramatic decline, particularly as women's education and labor market participation have evolved (Iregui-Bohórquez et al., 2024; Jaramillo-Echeverri, 2024). As shown in Table 2, the average number of children born to women has steadily decreased over time. For instance, the Silent Generation had an average of 6 children, which declined sharply for the High Fertility cohort to approximately 3.98 children in their twenties and thirties. This decline in fertility rates becomes even more evident when comparing these earlier generations to Millennials, who had an average of just 0.41 children by their mid-twenties and around 1 child by their thirties. Such differences highlight a generational shift toward smaller family sizes. Millennials, as well as Gen X women, appear to be delaying childbirth in pursuit of higher education and professional opportunities, suggesting a correlation between fertility and socioeconomic changes. This

pattern is closely tied to educational attainment, as seen in the higher rates of university completion among younger generations, suggesting that changes in fertility are not merely a function of generational preferences but are driven by broader socioeconomic transformations in Colombia.

### 5.1.2 Education

Education has been one of the most transformative forces shaping Colombia's social and economic development over the past century, for both women and men. Fig. 1 shows a marked improvement in schooling levels across generations and genders: the share of individuals with less than primary education fell dramatically from nearly 80% in the Silent Generation to just 10% among Millennials, reflecting the country's broad expansion of access to education (Ramírez-Giraldo & Salazar, 2007; Helg, 2001). At the same time, the proportion of women and men completing secondary education rose sharply among cohorts born after 1940, with more than half of Millennials reaching at least this level of schooling by adulthood. University attainment has risen steadily, especially among Generation X and Millennials women. Although both women and men gained greater access to education during the second half of the 20$^{th}$ century, the transformation of their occupational roles differed markedly.

Figure 1: Evolution of schooling rates by gender and generation




Notes: Share of men and women between the ages of 30 to 39 by their schooling level reported in the census. Sources: Authors' calculations based on 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Census samples from IPUMS-International and 2018 full census from DANE.

### 5.1.3 Occupation

As Fig. 2 shows, there is a strong positive correlation between higher education and labor force participation for women. Women with secondary or university education are far more likely to engage in paid work than those with less than primary schooling. For example, among university-educated women, over 50% reported holding a paid job across all cohorts except the Silent Generation. This shift is especially pronounced among Gen X and Millennials, who exhibit a significant decline in reporting housework as their primary occupation. By contrast, women with less than primary education continue to identify housework as their main activity across all generations, with only about 15% engaged in paid employment.

A particularly important transition occurs between the Silent Generation and the High Fertility cohort, when greater access to education coincides with a noticeable shift from domestic work toward paid employment. After this turning point, patterns of labor force participation stabilize, with Gen X and Millennials demonstrating consistently higher engagement in paid work, especially among those with advanced education. These trends mirror global patterns observed in industrialized countries, where rising educational attainment has been a critical driver of women's transition from domestic responsibilities to economic participation.

In contrast, men's occupational patterns exhibit less sensitivity to education. While the distribution of men's primary occupations has evolved over time, the link between educational attainment and paid work is far weaker than for women. Across generations, men have predominantly participated in the labor market, and only among Gen X do we observe a noticeable increase in men reporting housework as their main activity. Overall, the results reveal a substantial transformation for women, who have significantly increased their participation in paid employment, while only a small fraction of men have transitioned into household work.

While the census category "housework" does not directly measure unpaid or care work, its distribution across cohorts provides a useful proxy. Across all generations, women report housework as their main occupation far more frequently than men, who do so only marginally. This persistent gender gap suggests that occupational data, although limited, can serve as an early indication of the unequal burden of unpaid domestic and care responsibilities.

Figure 2: Evolution of primary occupation reported in census by education and generation

(a) Women




(b) Men




Notes: Share of men and women between the ages of 30 to 39 by their primary occupation reported in the census. The category "Other" includes: unemployed, studying and inactive. Sources: Authors' calculations based on 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Census samples from IPUMS-International and 2018 full census from DANE.

### 5.1.4 Share of women and men as head of households

Despite significant gains in educational attainment and labor market participation, the roles of women within Colombian households have evolved only modestly across generations. Fig. 3 shows that the proportion of women identified as heads of households increased from roughly 20% in the Silent Generation to about 34% among Millennials. Yet traditional household roles remain resilient: even university-educated women continue to predominantly identify as "spouse" rather than head of household. Among Millennials with less than primary education, an interesting pattern emerges: they are more likely to reside with their parents, potentially reflecting ongoing caregiving responsibilities. This contrasts with Generation X women, who were less likely to live with parents and more likely to assume household leadership. Younger and more educated women increasingly occupy nontraditional roles or remain daughters for longer periods, whereas older generations and less-educated women are predominantly spouses or heads of household.[3]

Male household roles show greater stability across generations. Between the Silent Generation and Generation X, roughly 70% of men report being heads of household, with very few identifying primarily as spouses. Millennials, however, display more diversity in household roles, reflecting broader social shifts. The results also suggest that higher education delays marriage for both genders, increasing the proportion of Millennials and Generation X categorized as sons or daughters.

In this sense, the rise in female headship should be interpreted with caution. As Habib (2020) shows for Bangladesh, women often become household heads only after a *de jure* dissolution (divorce or separation) or a *de facto* disruption (male migration or disability), rather than as a result of economic empowerment. The study indicates that woman, regardless of class or place of residence, do not assumes headship willingly, suggesting that female headship frequently reflects necessity rather than choice. A similar dynamic may operate in Colombia, where demographic shocks and family structures, rather than shifting norms, can explain part of the increase in women declaring themselves household heads.

These patterns underscore the persistence of gender norms: while educational and economic gains have expanded women's agency in public spheres, such as the workforce and higher

[3]We conduct the same analysis for married women only. Patterns are similar, with low participation as heads of households and Millennials more likely to live with parents.

education, private spheres, particularly household decision-making, have changed at a lower pace.

Figure 3: Evolution of the role in the household by education and generation

(a) Women




(b) Men




Notes: Share of women between the ages of 30 to 39 by their role in the household as reported in the census. The category "Other" includes other relatives, employees, or non-family household members. Sources: Authors' calculations based on 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Census samples from IPUMS-International and 2018 full census from DANE.

Overall, the analysis of historical patterns across generations reveals a significant transformation in the lives of Colombian women. The decline in fertility rates, particularly among Millennials, points to shifting social norms and priorities, with women increasingly delaying childbirth to pursue higher education and career opportunities. This trend is further supported by the substantial increase in educational attainment across generations, which has empowered women to participate more actively in the labor market.

Despite these gains, the changes in occupational roles remain closely tied to education, with a notable gap between women with less than primary schooling and those who have completed secondary or university education. While higher education has led to greater economic participation, the transition to leadership within the household has progressed at a much slower rate. Women remain predominantly identified as "spouse" across all generations and education levels, suggesting that traditional gender roles within the home persist despite broader societal advancements. Thus, the evolution of gender roles in Colombia reflects a complex interplay between progress in public spheres, such as education and employment, and the enduring norms governing private household responsibilities.

## 5.2 Cultural perception of gender roles today

Now we move to examine cultural perceptions of gender roles in Colombia, using a series of questions from the 2016–2017 and 2020–2021 National Time Use Survey (ENUT). Each question is analyzed by educational level and generation, with the aim of identifying the extent to which beliefs about the division of domestic tasks, economic contribution to the household, the role of working mothers, and household leadership have changed across generations and educational backgrounds, and how they differ between women and men. Analyzing these perceptions is key to understanding why, despite progress in education and women's labor market participation, inequalities in the distribution of unpaid work persist.

First, the belief that women are better than men at managing domestic responsibilities is analyzed. This indicator reflects the persistence or change of domestic stereotypes and allows for an assessment of how education and generational background influence the acceptance of these traditional roles. Fig. 4 shows the percentage of women who agree or disagree with the statement *"Women are better than men at household tasks"*. Overall, for both surveys, women with higher educational levels across all generations tend to disagree with the proposed statement than women with lower educational attainment within the same

generation. Additionally, changes in agreement/disagreement across generations are small and not monotonic. A modest divergence is observed among women with tertiary education from the high-fertility, low-labor-force generation, who exhibit slightly higher levels of agreement than their Gen X and Millennial counterparts. Furthermore, the 2020/2021 survey wave, conducted during the Covid-19 lockdowns, reveals a slight resurgence of traditional views, suggesting that women are better suited to housework than men. These findings highlight the enduring nature of cultural perceptions surrounding traditional gender roles, even among educated women, and underscore how social progress in this area can be vulnerable to regression in times of crisis.

The lockdown context not only increased the volume of household tasks for both men and women, but also pushed many women who lost their jobs to assume these responsibilities full time, thereby reinforcing traditional stereotypes. Moreover, the persistence of the belief that women are "better" at household tasks is partly linked to what Daminger (2019) describes as the cognitive dimension of household labor: the invisible mental work of anticipating needs, planning, and organizing. This less visible but crucial layer of domestic labor helps explain why such perceptions endure, even when men's participation in routine tasks has increased.

Interestingly, when men are asked if they agree/disagree with the same statement, their answers are very similar to those of women. In Fig. 5 we observe the same steep educational gradient, which indicates that the higher education a person has, the less they agree with traditional views on gender division of housework. There are insignificant differences across generations, but in 2020/2021 there is evidence of a reversal to more traditional roles, particularly among those with tertiary education.

Figure 4: Percentage of women who agree or disagree with the statement *"Women are better at housework than men"* by educational level

(a) 2016-2017




(b) 2020-2021




Notes: Women and men older than 15 years old working at least one hour in paid activities. Sources: ENUT 2016 and ENUT 2020.

Figure 5: Percentage of men who agree or disagree with the statement *"Women are better at housework than men"* by educational level

(a) 2016-2017




(b) 2020-2021




Notes: Women and men older than 15 years old working at least one hour in paid activities. Sources: ENUT 2016 and ENUT 2020.

Beyond perceptions of who takes on domestic tasks, it is crucial to investigate whether there is genuine consensus regarding economic responsibility within the household. This aspect not only reflects formal agreements about the contribution of women and men to family income, but also reveals the extent to which such agreements are, or are not, translated into equitable practice. The following figures illustrate how women and men from different

generations value the economic participation of both genders, highlighting the coexistence of an ideal of shared responsibility with potential persistent asymmetries in everyday life. Fig. 6 shows the percentage of women who agree or disagree with the statement *"Both men and women should contribute to household income"*. In Fig. 7 the same segmentation is applied, but for men. Overall, it is observed that there seems to be a general agreement among women and men of all generations, as over 80% agree with the statement. There is still evidence of the correlation between education level and less traditional perceptions of gender roles as individuals with tertiary education tend to exhibit more positive answers to the same statement.

As shown in the previous subsection, in Fig. 2, there is still a large share of women who are primarily focused on housework. Thus, even though women are expected to contribute financially, they still bear most of the responsibility for housework. This suggests that women are expected to both contribute financially and manage household duties, effectively taking on two jobs: unpaid housework and paid employment. The findings remark the complex challenges faced by contemporary women, who juggle multiple roles amid enduring traditional expectations (Gutiérrez de Pineda, 1987).

Figure 6: Percentage of women who agree or disagree with the statement *"Both men and women must contribute to the household income"* by educational level

(a) 2016-2017




(b) 2020-2021




Notes: Women and men older than 15 years old working at least one hour in paid activities. Sources: ENUT 2016 and ENUT 2020.

Figure 7: Percentage of men who agree or disagree with the statement *"Both men and women must contribute to the household income"* by educational level

(a) 2016-2017




(b) 2020-2021




Notes: Women and men older than 15 years old working at least one hour in paid activities. Sources: ENUT 2016 and ENUT 2020.

Another key dimension in gender perceptions is the evaluation of the role of the working mother. Analyzing this belief allows us to explore the extent to which women's paid work is seen as compatible with caregiving and child-rearing, and how this view has evolved over time. Fig. 8 exhibits the percentage of women who agree or disagree with the statement *"A mother who works outside her home is as good a mother as one who only works at*

*home"* and Fig. 9 presents equivalent results for men. In these case, the responses varied significantly across the 2016/2017 and 2020/2021 survey waves. In the 2016-2017 waves, approximately 40% of all women and men agreed with the statement, with higher agreement observed among highly educated individuals across all generations. Remarkably, during the 2020-2021 wave, there was a notable consensus among women and men of all generations and educational levels. In both cases, 85% agreed that a woman can be a "good mother" whether she works outside or at home.

This change could be attributed to two potential factors. First, the survey questions varied between the two waves. In the 2016-2017 wave, one question asked whether "a mother who works can form as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. However, in the 2020-2021 survey, the question only referred to women being "good mothers." Secondly, the second wave was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, which allowed many women to work from home. This likely made it easier for them to balance work and caregiving responsibilities, subsequently influencing the perceptions of what it means to be a good mother.

Figure 8: Percentage of women who agree or disagree with the statement *"A mother who works outside the home is as good a mother as one who only works at home"* by educational level.

(a) 2016-2017




(b) 2020-2021




Note: In the 2016-2017 National Time Use Survey, the statement was slightly different. Namely, "A mother who works can form a warm and secure relationship with her children as a mother who does not work." Women and men older than 15 years old working at least one hour in paid activities. Sources: ENUT 2016 and ENUT 2020.

Figure 9: Percentage of men who agree or disagree with the statement *"A mother who works outside the home is as good a mother as one who only works at home"* by educational level.

(a) 2016-2017




(b) 2020-2021




Note: In the 2016-2017 National Time Use Survey, the statement was slightly different. Namely, "A mother who works can form a warm and secure relationship with her children as a mother who does not work." Women and men older than 15 years old working at least one hour in paid activities. Sources: ENUT 2016 and ENUT 2020.

Finally, the perception of who should hold the headship of the household is analyzed, an indicator that directly links cultural beliefs with the actual distribution of power and decision-making within family life. This perspective also reveals the sometimes invisible persistence of traditional structures that continue to shape domestic hierarchies. Fig. 10 presents the

percentage of women who agree or disagree with the statement *"The head of the household should be the man"* broken down by generation and educational level. The data reveal that, across generations, disagreement with this traditional view increases with higher educational attainment, though differences between generations at the same education level are relatively small. In comparison, Fig. 11 shows that men are consistently more likely than women to agree with this statement, even among those with tertiary education.

These attitudinal patterns can be contrasted with the structural changes shown in Fig. 3, which highlights the growing prevalence of female-headed households over time. Among Silent Generation women, roughly a fifth reported being heads of household, compared to approximately a third of Millennial women. Notably, Millennial women with only primary education report the highest rate of household headship across all generations and education levels. Similarly, those with secondary education are 13 percentage points more likely to report being the head of the household than their Silent Generation counterparts. This trend holds across all education levels and is also observable among men, as shown in Fig. 11.

However, we are cautious in concluding that this slight change in gender roles within the household is solely due to changes in cultural perceptions as Colombia has a very high rate of single motherhood, which forces women to take on the role of head of household out of necessity rather than choice, highlighting a complex interplay between cultural beliefs, socioeconomic factors, and family dynamics. This would be, in fact, contrary to more egalitarian gender roles as in such cases, all caregiving, economic, and financial responsibilities are forcefully designated to women.

Figure 10: Percentage of women who agree or disagree with the statement *"The head of the household should be the man"* by educational level

(a) 2016-2017




(b) 2020-2021




Notes: Women and men older than 15 years old working at least one hour in paid activities. Sources: ENUT 2016 and ENUT 2020.

Figure 11: Percentage of men who agree or disagree with the statement *"The head of the household should be the man"* by educational level

(a) 2016-2017




(b) 2020-2021




Notes: Women and men older than 15 years old working at least one hour in paid activities. Sources: ENUT 2016 and ENUT 2020.

The results we presented reveal several significant findings. First, education influences women's and men's declared perceptions about gender roles. Although there is yet to be demonstrated that the shift in perceptions to more egalitarian roles translates into *de facto* more egalitarian share of household chores and financial responsibilities. Furthermore, most women and men agree that both genders should contribute financially to the household,

but this expectation is met with an ongoing imbalance in domestic labor and limited labor market participation, with a significant proportion of women of all generations primarily dedicated to housework and not to market activities.

Interestingly, while many women believe that a working mother can be just as good a parent as one who stays at home, the transition to becoming the household head remains limited. Even among younger and more educated generations, only around a third of women report being the head of their household, indicating that traditional gender norms persist.

Overall, our findings show that while education can help challenge traditional views on gender, it is not enough on its own to change the deeply rooted roles women and men often hold within the household. This points to the need for broader social, cultural, and policy changes to achieve a fairer division of domestic work and financial responsibilities and to strengthen women's economic empowerment through greater participation in the labor market. These results can be better understood through the lens of different household bargaining frameworks. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) "separate spheres" model suggests that the effect of additional resources depends on how roles are divided to begin with and on the social norms that sustain that division. Bittman, England, Folbre, Sayer, and Matheson (2003) find that when women's earnings increase relative to their partners, their domestic workload tends to fall, but this effect can level off or even reverse when women earn substantially more. Salazar-Saenz (2024) develops a household search model with home production, showing that time allocation between paid and unpaid work is determined not only by market wages and home productivity, but also by job search frictions and the social costs associated with deviating from traditional gender roles.Taken together, the persistence of unequal time use among higher-income or higher-educated women does not mean that social norms simply outweigh economic incentives. Rather, it shows that norms and identity considerations can shape and sometimes counterbalance economic forces, while personal preferences and individual agency also play a role.

## 5.3 Use of time today

In this subsection, we observe how people distribute their time between paid work and unpaid work. Our analysis unfolds in three acts: first, we analyze time use for single individuals with no children at home, both men and women, to study baseline differences among those with the lowest care responsibilities as there are no kids in their households, then we study

how the composition of time use changes with cohabitation, and finally we look at the data on time use for married couples with children. The arrival of children often marks a turning point in family life, reshaping routines, priorities, and the way time is distributed among household members. As noted by Bianchi et al. (2000), this event not only brings new caregiving demands but also disproportionately increases the burden of domestic and unpaid work for women, even when they continue to play an active role in the labor market. This pattern is not unique to Colombia; international comparisons show that, even in contexts with greater progress toward shared responsibility, significant differences persist in the division of childcare, with mothers assuming the majority of these tasks (Craig & Mullan, 2011). Studying time use during this critical moment allows us to understand not only how gender gaps open or close throughout the life cycle, but also how education and generational background influence the way families respond to this shift.

Even among single adults, when household care demands are expected to be relatively low, systematic gender differences in time allocation are observed. As shown in Fig. 12 and Table 5 single women devote more hours to unpaid work than single men, while men allocate slightly more time to paid work. For example, in 2016–2017 the unpaid-work gap for single women without children ranged from 0.6 to 2.4 additional hours per day, while differences in paid work were modest or negligible. In 2020–2021 this disparity persisted, with the unpaid gap between 0.35 and 1.32 hours per week and no consistent divergence in paid work. These patterns are consistent with persistent arrangements of the social organization of care, where women assume a greater share of domestic responsibilities and men assume a greater share of financial responsibilities. Importantly, generational dynamics shape these averages: younger single women without children combine relatively lower unpaid workloads with higher participation in education and labor markets, whereas older single women are more likely to co-reside with parents or relatives in need of assistance, which raises their unpaid burden. Overall, the evidence suggests that labor market opportunities mitigate, but do not fully eliminate, gendered patterns of domestic time allocation across generations.

Figure 12: Average daily hours dedicated to paid and unpaid work by education and generation - *single without children at home active in the labor market*

(a) Women


(b) Men




Notes: Women and men older than 15 years old working at least one hour in paid activities. Sources: ENUT 2016 and ENUT 2020.

Table 5: Mean differences of paid work and unpaid work for single women and men who are active in the labor market and do not have children at home.

Panel A: 2016-2017

| | Millennials | | | Gen X | | | High Fertility and Low LFP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. |
| **Primary and less** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 7.32 | 8.08 | -0.76* | 7.89 | 7.75 | 0.14 | 7.46 | 7.66 | -0.2 |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 5.3 | 2.89 | 2.41*** | 4.22 | 3.37 | 0.85*** | 4.05 | 3.25 | 0.8*** |
| **Secondary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (%) | 7.85 | 8.56 | -0.71*** | 7.74 | 7.68 | 0.06 | 7.44 | 8.11 | -0.67* |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 4.27 | 2.55 | 1.72*** | 3.48 | 2.8 | 0.68*** | 4.27 | 2.55 | 1.72*** |
| **Tertiary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 7.83 | 7.58 | 0.25* | 7.94 | 7.78 | 0.16 | 7.57 | 7.27 | 0.3 |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 3.4 | 2.81 | 0.59*** | 3.39 | 2.8 | 0.59*** | 3.72 | 2.88 | 0.84** |

Panel B: 2020-2021

| | Millennials | | | Gen X | | | High Fertility and Low LFP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. |
| **Primary and less** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 7.96 | 7.98 | -0.02 | 7.36 | 8.19 | -0.83*** | 7.17 | 7.64 | -0.47* |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 3.79 | 2.81 | 0.98** | 4.02 | 2.8 | 1.22*** | 4.07 | 3.06 | 1.01*** |
| **Secondary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (%) | 7.69 | 7.9 | -0.21 | 7.6 | 7.85 | -0.25 | 7.13 | 7.86 | -0.73* |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 3.67 | 2.45 | 1.22*** | 3.45 | 2.61 | 0.84*** | 3.38 | 3.03 | 0.35 |
| **Tertiary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 8.06 | 7.76 | 0.3*** | 7.79 | 7.55 | 0.24 | 7.15 | 6.74 | 0.41 |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 3.24 | 2.58 | 0.66*** | 4.09 | 2.77 | 1.32*** | 3.3 | 2.93 | 0.37 |

Note: The stars can be interpreted as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The results for Gen Z are not presented in this table given the low sample size.
Source: ENUT 2016–2017 and 2020–2021, own elaboration.

Moving to cohabitation even before children arrive, couples reallocate time asymmetrically: women increase their participation in unpaid domestic and care tasks, while men concentrate relatively more hours in paid work. As Fig. 13 illustrates and Table 6 documents, in 2016–2017 the female–male gap in paid hours among married adults without children ranged from about 1.8 to 0.6 hours, while the corresponding gap in unpaid hours spanned +0.65 to +2.23 hours.[4] By 2020–2021, differences in paid work had narrowed to 0.96 to 0.06 hours, and even turned marginally positive in one tertiary cell (+0.24), yet the unpaid wedge remained substantive at +0.68 to +1.70 hours. The education gradient is stable across waves: tertiary-educated couples consistently display the smallest unpaid differences,

[4]Appendix Fig. A.1 and Fig. A.5 report confidence intervals for the means discussed in Figures 12–16, confirming the robustness of the observed differences. From Fig. 13 onwards, Generation Z is excluded from the analysis due to limited observations in this cohort.

whereas primary and secondary levels show the largest wedges. This difference is significant and persistent across generations. This indicates that improved outside options compress specialisation in paid work more rapidly than they transform unpaid divisions at home.

Figure 13: Average daily hours dedicated to paid and unpaid work by education and generation - *married without children at home active in the labor market*

(a) Women


(b) Men


Notes: Women and men older than 15 years old working at least one hour in paid activities. Sources: ENUT 2016 and ENUT 2020.

Table 6: Mean differences of paid work and unpaid work for married women and men who are active in the labor market and do not have children at home.

Panel A: 2016-2017

| | Millennials | | | Gen X | | | High Fertility and Low LFP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. |
| **Primary and less** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 6.6 | 8.38 | -1.78*** | 7.21 | 8.19 | -0.98*** | 6.54 | 7.49 | -0.95*** |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 5.7 | 3.47 | 2.23*** | 4.62 | 3.31 | 1.31*** | 4.48 | 3.33 | 1.15*** |
| **Secondary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (%) | 7.74 | 8.46 | -0.72*** | 7.74 | 8.35 | -0.61*** | 7 | 7.89 | -0.89*** |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 4.78 | 3.38 | 1.4*** | 4.28 | 3.46 | 0.82*** | 4.61 | 3.46 | 1.15*** |
| **Tertiary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 7.7 | 8.35 | -0.65*** | 7.51 | 8.15 | -0.64*** | 7.15 | 8.03 | -0.88*** |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 4.11 | 3.46 | 0.65*** | 3.77 | 3.2 | 0.57*** | 3.93 | 2.98 | 0.95*** |

Panel B: 2020-2021

| | Millennials | | | Gen X | | | High Fertility and Low LFP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. |
| **Primary and less** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 6.83 | 7.79 | -0.96** | 7.2 | 7.8 | -0.6*** | 6.82 | 7.38 | -0.56*** |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 4.03 | 2.52 | 1.51*** | 4.63 | 3.02 | 1.61*** | 4.41 | 2.9 | 1.51*** |
| **Secondary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (%) | 7.62 | 8.11 | -0.49*** | 7.34 | 8 | -0.66*** | 6.35 | 7.58 | -1.22*** |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 4.05 | 2.83 | 1.22*** | 3.81 | 2.71 | 1.1*** | 4.45 | 2.75 | 1.7*** |
| **Tertiary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 8.06 | 8.12 | -0.06 | 7.66 | 7.72 | -0.06 | 7.26 | 7.02 | 0.24 |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 3.49 | 2.81 | 0.68** | 3.8 | 3.09 | 0.71*** | 3.59 | 2.67 | 0.92*** |

Note: The stars can be interpreted as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: ENUT 2016–2017 and 2020–2021, own elaboration.

The transition to parenthood marks the stage where gender differences in time allocation become most pronounced. Evidence for fourteen Latin American countries indicates that the so-called motherhood effect constitutes one of the most persistent components of the gender income gap: it accounts for approximately 41% of the difference between mothers and fathers and 34% of the overall gender gap in earnings. This effect operates through multiple channels, including a decline in women's employment probability (around 28%), a reduction of 8.9% in hours among those who remain employed, and a 55.2% increase in informality, with impacts that persist over time (Marchionni & Pedrazzi, 2025). As Figure 14 shows, in the Colombian ENUT data the divergence arises mainly through the unpaid dimension: women's paid hours decrease relative to men's, while their unpaid hours increase.

Figure 14: Average daily hours dedicated to pad and unpaid work by education and generation - *married with children at home active in the labor market*

(a) Women


(b) Men




Notes: Women and men older than 15 years old working at least one hour in paid activities. Sources: ENUT 2016 and ENUT 2020.

Two patterns stand out once children are present. *First, the unpaid dimension accounts*

*for most of the divergence.* In 2016–2017, the female–male gap in paid work ranged from 2.16 to 0.44 hours, while the unpaid gap spanned +0.97 to +3.12 hours; in 2020–2021, paid gaps narrowed but remained negative (−1.33 to 0.10 hours), and unpaid gaps remained large (+0.63 to +2.97 hours) (Table 7). *Second, education compresses but does not eliminate the gap.* In several tertiary-education cells, paid-hour differences approach zero, yet unpaid differences persist around 1–2.5 hours.

Table 7: Mean differences of paid work and unpaid work for women and men married who are active in the labor market and have children at home.

Panel A: 2016-2017

| | Millennials | | | Gen X | | | High Fertility and Low LFP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. |
| **Primary and less** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 6.25 | 8.41 | -2.16*** | 6.67 | 8.33 | -1.66*** | 6.7 | 7.82 | -1.12*** |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 7.01 | 3.89 | 3.12*** | 5.6 | 3.91 | 1.69*** | 5.18 | 3.66 | 1.52*** |
| **Secondary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (%) | 7.35 | 8.8 | -1.45*** | 7.34 | 8.52 | -1.18*** | 7.49 | 8.26 | -0.77** |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 6.6 | 4.29 | 2.31*** | 5.34 | 4.18 | 1.16*** | 4.93 | 3.68 | 1.25*** |
| **Tertiary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 7.59 | 8.56 | -0.97*** | 7.62 | 8.06 | -0.44*** | 6.94 | 8.1 | -1.16** |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 6.26 | 4.66 | 1.6*** | 5.35 | 4.38 | 0.97*** | 4.71 | 3.54 | 1.17** |

Panel B: 2020-2021

| | Millennials | | | Gen X | | | High Fertility and Low LFP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. | Female | Male | Mean Diff. |
| **Primary and less** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 7.07 | 8.22 | -1.15*** | 7.07 | 7.96 | -0.89*** | 6.24 | 7.55 | -1.31*** |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 6.22 | 3.25 | 2.97*** | 4.95 | 3.5 | 1.45*** | 5.05 | 2.69 | 2.36*** |
| **Secondary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (%) | 7.46 | 8.45 | -0.99*** | 7.19 | 8.18 | -0.99*** | 7.56 | 8.01 | -0.5 |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 5.84 | 3.72 | 2.12*** | 4.96 | 3.68 | 1.28*** | 3.95 | 3.32 | 0.63 |
| **Tertiary** | | | | | | | | | |
| Paid work (hours) | 7.63 | 8.36 | -0.73*** | 7.92 | 8.02 | -0.1 | 6.58 | 7.91 | -1.33** |
| Unpaid work (hours) | 6.35 | 3.96 | 2.39*** | 4.92 | 3.68 | 1.24*** | 4.51 | 3.4 | 1.11 |

Note: The stars can be interpreted as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: ENUT 2016–2017 and 2020–2021, own elaboration.

This demographic and care transition intersects with prevailing gendered divisions of labor that continue to place women more heavily in caregiving roles. In the absence of mechanisms that redistribute domestic responsibilities or expand accessible care services, progress in labor market participation remains exposed to reversal. The COVID-19 pandemic offered a clear example: disruptions in daily routines and institutional support deepened pre-existing asymmetries, increasing women's participation in informality and subsistence self-employment. A

partial return to traditional role patterns during this period illustrates how fragile gains can be when shocks undermine household coordination and social infrastructure.

Viewed through the lens of time use and care, gender differences in Colombia appear not as isolated outcomes but as a structural and cumulative process. The evidence shows that while advances in education and labor markets have narrowed some gaps, these have not been accompanied by a parallel redistribution of unpaid domestic work. As a result, women continue to combine market participation with higher unpaid workloads, a pattern often referred to as the double burden. Market convergence by itself has not been sufficient to close these gaps. The persistence of this arrangement indicates the importance of moving toward policies that recognize the economic significance of care and promote its redistribution between households, markets, and the state. Developing a broader "society of care", as emphasized in CEPAL (2025), is therefore not only a normative aspiration but also a condition for sustaining long-term economic and social well-being.

## 5.4 Income and unpaid work

Finally, we turn to cohabitating couples to examine the proportion of household income earned by each partner, measured as the summation of total income of each partner, and their share of unpaid labor in the home. We present two main visualisations.

In the light of Bertrand et al. (2015), we construct Fig. 15, which illustrates the distribution of women's contributions to household income across three generations: Millennial, Gen X, and the High-Fertility generation. For this figure, we only include in the sample couples in which both household members have positive incomes, and the generation is determined by the age of the woman. The results show that a distinct pattern emerges: a substantial proportion of women contribute exactly half of the household income, producing the highest peak in the distribution across all three generations. At the same time, most women's contributions lie at the lower end of the distribution, indicating that the majority earn less than half of the total household income. This trend is consistent across all generations [5].

[5]If we perform the same analysis including all the couples, even those in which one partner reports zero income, we observe for Millennials a bimodal distribution, with a large bunching of women at zero contribution to the household income and another peak at 100% contribution as Appendix Fig. A.7 shows.

Figure 15: Proportion of income brought into the household by women, 2020




Sources: Authors' calculations based on ENUT 2020 waves.

Fig. 16 provides further evidence by comparing women's share of household income with their share of unpaid labor, segmented by generation. Across all groups, most women contribute less than half of the household income, and regardless of their income, the majority of women contribute more than 75% of the unpaid work at home. For Millennials and women in the High Fertility generation, the unpaid workload declines slightly when their share of household income increases. However, it stays well above 0.5, showing that even primary earners still perform a disproportionate amount of unpaid labor. On the contrary, for women of Gen X, the workload increases when the proportion of income brought is higher than 60%. This pattern supports the gender deviance hypothesis, which posits that women may increase their domestic labor to compensate for deviations from traditional provider roles. These results show that economic contributions do not significantly reduce domestic responsibilities for women. This reflects the persistence of traditional gender roles, where women are expected to maintain their domestic duties even as they achieve economic advancements in the workforce. As Olivetti et al. (2024) demonstrates, while women have made significant progress in closing

gender gaps in contributing to the household's income, the allocation of housework is still heavily gendered [6].

Figure 16: Contribution to income and household work




Sources: Authors' calculations based on ENUT 2020 wave.

These patterns are not unique to the 2020-2021 survey wave. Similar trends were observed in the 2016-2017 wave, reinforcing that these dynamics are persistent and deeply ingrained in Colombian society. The corresponding graphs from the earlier survey wave are presented in Appendix Figures A.6 and A.8.

These results reveal that as women's financial contributions to their households increase, their share of unpaid labor does not tend to decrease significantly over time. The persistence of this pattern across generations emphasizes that women in Colombia continue to balance both public and private expectations, contributing financially while maintaining traditional

[6] Appendix Table A.1 shows the average age gaps between couples, which could, partially, explain why women bring less income home while perform more unpaid care as married men tend to be older than their partners and accrue more work experience at the time of marriage. We find that, on average, for Millennials and Gen X couples, males tend to be 3 years older than their female counterparts. For the High Fertility generation, we observe a larger age gap of 5 years, which could potentially be underestimated as we can only measure it for couples in which both members are still alive, and 20% of the women of that generation in our sample are widows

domestic roles. These findings highlight the gendered nature of unpaid work and the need for societal change to more equitably distribute domestic responsibilities.

# 6 Conclusion

Gender differences in the distribution of time in Colombia are not static, but evolve across the life cycle. The evidence presented here documents an incomplete transformation: while women have achieved remarkable progress in education and labor market participation, this progress has not been matched by a proportional reallocation of unpaid domestic work. The data show that gaps emerge early in adulthood, widen with cohabitation, and become most pronounced with the arrival of children. These patterns reflect the persistence of social norms that continue to assign a larger share of care and household tasks to women, irrespective of their educational attainment or economic contribution.

The correlation between education and women's labor force participation is strong: university attainment has risen from under 1% among the Silent Generation to nearly 24% among Millennials, and higher education is associated with greater access to paid employment. However, the 2016–2017 and 2020–2021 National Time Use Surveys reveal that these gains do not translate into a more equitable division of domestic responsibilities. Women across generations and income levels continue to dedicate an average of over three hours per day to unpaid work. Moreover, consistent with the "gender deviance" hypothesis, women who contribute more than half of household income often still assume high levels of unpaid work, illustrating that income convergence alone does not automatically alter household dynamics.

The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the vulnerability of these arrangements: as institutions and routines were disrupted, women absorbed a disproportionate share of the additional unpaid work, often at the cost of increased informality and subsistence activities. Motherhood, in particular, consolidates one of the most rigid penalties in the labor market, with effects on employment, hours, and informality that persist over time. Looking ahead, Colombia's demographic transition will shift care demands from children to older adults, suggesting that without institutional responses, pressures on unpaid time are likely to intensify.

In this context, the findings point to the need for policies that recognize the economic relevance of unpaid work and promote a more balanced distribution of care responsibilities. Developing care systems that complement households, expanding access to formal long-term

care, and fostering co-responsibility across genders and institutions are crucial steps. These measures are not only relevant from a gender-equity perspective but also from an economic and demographic standpoint, as they underpin the sustainability of labor force participation and social well-being in the long run.

Yet women's empowerment in education, employment, and income has not produced a comparable balance within households. The domestic sphere, being more private and less subject to economic or institutional incentives, appears harder to transform. For this reason, policy interventions must not only expand services and opportunities but also be consistent and sustained over time, aiming to shift the underlying social norms. Without such persistent efforts, the "revolution" will remain incomplete—advancing in the public sphere but failing to enter the home.

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# Appendices

Figure A.1: Confidence intervals for the means in Figure 12.

(a) 2016–2017




(b) 2020–2021



Figure A.2: Confidence intervals for the means in Figure 13.[7]

(a) 2016–2017




(b) 2020–2021




[7]Generation Z is excluded due to limited observations.

Figure A.3: Confidence intervals for the means in Figure 14.[8]

(a) 2016–2017




(b) 2020–2021




[7]Generation Z is excluded due to limited observations.

Figure A.4: Confidence intervals for the means in Figure 15.[8]

(a) 2016–2017




(b) 2020–2021




[7]Generation Z is excluded due to limited observations.

Figure A.5: Confidence intervals for the means in Figure 16.[8]

(a) Women




(b) Men




[7]Generation Z is excluded due to limited observations.

Figure A.6: Proportion of income brought into the household by women, 2016




Sources: Authors' calculations based on ENUT 2016 wave.

Figure A.7: Proportion of income brought into the household by women (all couples, including when one partner reports no income), 2016




Sources: Authors' calculations based on ENUT 2016 wave.

Table A.1: Summary of Age Gap Between Partners by Generation

| **Cohort** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Observations** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Millennials (1981-1996) | 3.83 | 7.06 | 9,085 |
| Gen X (1966–1980) | 3.32 | 6.64 | 7,702 |
| High Fertility (1936-1965) | 5.06 | 6.75 | 843 |

Source: Authors' calculations based on ENUT 2016 wave.

Figure A.8: Contribution to income and household work, 2016




Sources: Authors' calculations based on ENUT 2016 wave.