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dc.creatorValencia-Arana, Oscar Mauricio
dc.creatorGómez-González, José Eduardo
dc.creatorGarcía-Suaza, Andrés Felipe
dc.date.created2017-06-12
dc.date.issued2017-06-12
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/6317
dc.description.abstractCan technological misallocation generate financial frictions? We build a theoretical model with testable implications, in which the misallocation between R&D and production activities generates borrowing constraints. The investor offers the innovator a rent that is contingent to the success of its project in order to make them exert an incentive-compatible effort level. However, this rent distorts the allocation of effort between activities. Specifically, it leads to a suboptimal level of effort impulsing a reallocation of resources from production to R&D. Consequently, the investor cannot appropriate the surplus resulting from innovation. This distortion increases the cost of external financing for firms that have large amount of intangible assets. Using Compustat data for manufacturing firms in the United States between 1982 and 2007, we show that cash-flow sensitivities are positive and increasing in firms with high R&D intensities.
dc.format.extent20 páginas : tablas
dc.format.mimetypePDF
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherBanco de la República de Colombia
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de trabajo
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBorradores de Economía
dc.relation.isversionofBorradores de Economía; No. 1004
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Access
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.subjectRiesgo moral
dc.subjectRestricciones de crédito y mala asignación tecnológica
dc.titleYoung innovative firms, investment-cash flow sensitivities and technological misallocation
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.subject.jelD86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
dc.subject.jelO33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
dc.subject.jelG11 - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
dc.audiencePolicymakers
dc.audienceResearchers
dc.audienceStudents
dc.audienceTeachers
dc.subject.keywordMoral hazard
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous borrowing constraints and technological misallocation
dc.subject.lembCrédito -- Flujo de efectivo -- Estados Unidos -- 1982-2007
dc.subject.lembInversiones -- Toma de decisiones -- Errores
dc.subject.lembInnovaciones empresariales -- Toma de decisiones -- Errores
dc.subject.lembRiesgo (Economía)
dc.type.spaDocumentos de trabajo
dc.rights.spaAcceso abierto
dc.rights.ccAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
dc.subject.jelspaG11 - Selección de cartera; Decisiones de inversión
dc.subject.jelspaD86 - Economía de los contratos: teoría
dc.subject.jelspaO33 - Cambio tecnológico: opciones y consecuencias; Difusión
dc.type.hasversionPublished Version
dc.coverage.sucursalBogotá
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAcharya, V. V., Almeida, H., and Campello, M. (2007). Is cash negative debt? a hedging perspective on corporate financial policies. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16(4):515–554.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAlmeida, H. and Campello, M. (2007). Financial constraints, asset tangibility, and corporate investment. Review of Financial Studies, 20(5):1429–1460.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAlmeida, H., Campello, M., and Weisbach, M. S. (2004). The cash flow sensitivity of cash. The Journal of Finance, 59(4):1777–1804.
dc.rights.disclaimerLas opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.
dc.relation.repechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/1004.html
dc.identifier.handlehttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/6317


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