Transparency : can central banks commit to truthful communication?
Borradores de Economía; No. 711
Date published
2012-05-18Date of last update
2012-05-18Document language
spaMetadata
Show full item recordLas opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.
Abstract
To evaluate whether transparency is beneficial, it is usual to assume that the central bank may choose one of two options, opacity versus truthful communication. However, the monetary policymaker may have incentives to misrepresent private information so
JEL Codes
Keywords
URI
http://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5754http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5754
http://doi.org/10.32468/be.711
https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/711.html
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- Borradores de Economía [1093]
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