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dc.creatorCarvajal, Andrés
dc.date.created2003-01-18
dc.date.issued2003-01-18
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5247
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite dat
dc.format.mimetypePDF
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherBanco de la República
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de Trabajo
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBorradores de Economía
dc.relation.isversionofBorradores de Economía; No. 229
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Access
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.titleTestable restrictions of Nash equilibrium in games with continuous domains
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.subject.jelC92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
dc.subject.jelC71 - Cooperative Games
dc.subject.jelC72 - Noncooperative Games
dc.subject.jelD70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
dc.subject.keywordGame theory
dc.subject.keywordTestable restrictions
dc.subject.keywordRevealed preferences
dc.subject.lembTeoría de los juegos
dc.subject.lembEquilibrio de Nash
dc.subject.lembMatemáticas financieras
dc.type.spaDocumentos de trabajo
dc.rights.spaAcceso abierto
dc.rights.ccAtribucion-NoComercial-CompartirIgual CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
dc.subject.jelspaC71 - Juegos cooperativos
dc.subject.jelspaC72 - Juegos no cooperativos
dc.subject.jelspaC92 - Laboratorio, comportamiento de grupo
dc.subject.jelspaD70 - Análisis de la toma de decisiones colectiva: Generalidades
dc.type.hasversionPublished Version
dc.coverage.sucursalBogotá
dc.relation.doihttps://doi.org/10.32468/be.229
dc.rights.disclaimerLas opiniones contenidas en el presente documento son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no comprometen al Banco de la República ni a su Junta Directiva.
dc.relation.numberBorrador 229
dc.relation.repechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/bdr/borrec/229.html
dc.relation.dotechttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/003555.html
dc.identifier.handlehttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12134/5247
dc.source.handleRepecRePEc:bdr:borrec:229


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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial 4.0.This document has been deposited by the author (s) under the following certificate of deposit